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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
SEARCHING FOR PROBABLE CAUSE
S. M. FALLI*
A journey into the law of search and seizure in Oklahoma
is a trip marked with dead-end roads, mis-marked trails and
conflicting road signs. The legal morass in which the student
or practitioner finds himself, should he venture on such a trip,
is undoubtedly caused in part by the historical fact of prohi-
bition in Oklahoma. The decisions reveal that the great ma-
jority of search and seizure cases have concerned violations
of the liquor prohibition laws that existed in the state until
1959.1 The fact that there was considerable public sentiment
against these laws accounts, perhaps, for the great number
of appellate decisions in this area. It must be noted that al-
most every Oklahoma search and seizure decision involves the
question of the legality of search warrants used to obtain evi-
dence for the prosecution of misdemeanors. Therefore, any
examination of the law of search and seizure must be con-
sidered in light of prohibition. It must also be remembered
that even though prohibition has been repealed the effects
of search and seizure law established during "the dry years"
lives on.
This article is not intended to be a review or study of all
facets of the law applicable to the issuance of search war-
rants. It is intended rather as an inquiry into probable cause
as applied to affidavits for the issuance of valid search war-
rants in Oklahoma. The purpose is to attempt to discover what
probable cause is, and, what it can be or might be. On this
basis our search for probable cause begins.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
The Oklahoma constitutional provision relating to the is-
suance of search warrants2 is a restrictive one and almost an
*District Attorney for the District of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.
1 Ch 37, (1959) Okla. Laws 141, Repealing OKLA. STAT. tit 19,
§ 501 (1951).2 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30.
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exact copy of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. The term "probable cause" is found in this
amendment; it is the basis for the requirement that no search
warrant can legally issue except upon a showing of probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation.
Oklahoma statutes amplify the constitutional require-
ments for search warrants:
A Search Warrant shall not be issued except upon prob-
able cause, supported by affidavit naming or describing
the person and particularly describing the property and
place to be searched.3
The magistrate must, before issuing the warrant, take,
on oath, the complaint of the prosecuting witness in
writing which must set forth the facts tending to estab-
lish the grounds of the application or probable cause for
believing that they exist.4
The basic tenet that a magistrate must find probable
cause before granting the authority that opens the door for
law enforcement is not open to question.
The law is well established in Oklahoma that, although
there should be a strict construction of the affidavit for a
search warrant, it should not be so technical as to destroy
the true meaning. The court logically recognizes that reason
should be exercised when considering these affidavits. The
fact does remain, however, that there are conflicting cases in
regard to the application of the constitutional provision. For
example, the court expressed the following attitude of cau-
tion in the case of Gore v. State:6
It is not the purpose of these Constitutional provisions
to build a wall behind which criminals can hide and
escape punishment. Some of them do and will escape but
better so than disregard these safeguards designed to
protect the innocent from being harrassed and annoyed,
and sometimes abused by trespassing officers.
7
3 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1223 (1961).
4 OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1224 (1961).
5 Southard v. State, 297 P.2d 585 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
624 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545 (1923).
7 Id. at 412, 218 P. at 550.
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that prob-
able cause is sufficiently shown in an affidavit if a man of
ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe, and
conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of, the guilt of
the accused.8 The application of this general rule of law,
however, has become more technical.
REQUISM S FOR THE VALID WAMANT
A positive statement can be made, based on the law of
this state, that a complaint on "information and belief" would
not constitute grounds upon which a magistrate may issue a
valid search warrant.9 It should be pointed out that there is
a qualification to this rule. Though the term "information and
belief" might have been used in the first portion of the affi-
davit, a later statement of facts in that same affidavit can
give the magistrate grounds to find probable cause.10 The
reverse of this is also true. A bare statement alleging that the
affiant has probable cause for believing and does believe, with-
out an enumeration of facts and circumstances substantiating
the affiant's belief, cannot be the grounds for a valid search
warrant. 1 It is interesting to note that authority can be found
in Oklahoma cases for the proposition that mere positive
statements, or an affidavit in positive terms, may be sufficient
even without a statement of facts upon which the informa-
tion is based.12 In 1937 a more accurate rule was announced by
the court in Denton v. State:18
We are therefore of the opinion that the affidavit was
sufficient for the officer to issue the search warrant for
the reason that the statements made therein are positive.
But in this connection and for future guidance we will
say we think it is very much better practice to state
in the affidavit the very facts upon which the informa-
8 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948).
9 Sikes v. State, 323 P.2d 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
10 Hays v. State, 71 Okla. Crim. 62, 108 P.2d 186 (1940).
"Foley v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. 145, 219 P. 179 (1923).
12 McCarthy v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 51, 189 P.2d 436 (1948).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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tion is based so the officer may have this information
before the warrant is issued.14
It is submitted that Oklahoma requires the following for
a valid search warrant:
(a) a written affidavit establishing probable cause, not
merely "information and belief"; and,
(b) a statement of facts or circumstances within the
affidavit sufficient to give the magistrate the necessary
grounds to make a finding of probable cause.
The question arises as to the type of statements of fact
sufficient to establish probable cause. An attempt to determine
general rules of definition gives one the feeling of being lost
in a maze. This is obvious since the court itself has recognized
the confusion concerning search warrants when it said in
Y.eargain v. State: 15
This question has been before this court upon many dif-
ferent occasions and it is true that there not only is a
seemingly [sic] conflict in some of the decisions but
there is a conflict.1
A general statement of law to be considered is found
in Reutlinger v. State:17
An affidavit for a search warrant which merely states
the conclusions of the affiant indicative of a positive
violation of law, is insufficient. The affidavit should
state the facts upon which the conclusion is based.' 8
The Oklahoma court recognizes, however, that it is diffi-
cult to differentiate between evidentiary facts and mere con-
clusions.19 There can be little argument on this point, par-
ticularly when one considers that an affidavit for a search
13 62 Okla. Crim. 8, 70 P.2d 135 (1937).
14 Id. at 16, 70 P.2d at 139.
15 67 Okla. Crim. 262, 93 P.2d 1104 (1939).
16 Id. at 264, 93 P.2d at 1105.
17 29 Okla. Crim. 290, 234 P. 224 (1925).
18 Id. 234 P. at 226.
19 Smith v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 144, 235 P. 273 (1925).
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warrant which alleged the following "facts" was held
sufficient:
that certain intoxicating liquor is being manufactured,
sold, bartered, given away, and otherwise furnished, and
is being kept for the purpose of being sold, bartered,
given away, and otherwise furnished, in violation of the
prohibitory law of the state of Oklahoma (there follows
a description of the liquor). That said liquor is being dis-
posed of and kept in the manner aforesaid by one John
Doe, whose real name is unknown to informant (there
follows a description of the property to be searched)
"That said building is a private residence, and is used as
a place of public resort, and for the storage and furnish-
ing of intoxicating liquor. '20
In contrast, in Hannan v. State,21 the affidavit read as
follows:
That intoxicating liquors are being kept by John Doe,
and in the said John Doe's possession, in a certain build-
ing situated at 616-618 E. Avenue in the City of Lawton,
County of Comanche, and State of Oklahoma, for the
purpose and with the intent of the said John Doe to sell
the same in violation of the law, and for the purpose of
committing a public offense.22
The court concluded that the allegations were nothing more
than "naked conclusions". The court distinguished the two
affidavits in three ways:
First, in naming and describing the persons; second, in
naming and describing the intoxicating liquors; and
third in describing the character of the place where the
liquors were being kept. In the Hannan Case nothing is
stated by naked conclusions; in the instant case there
are some facts stated designating the person in posses-
sion, the kind of liquor, and the character of the place
where it was being kept.2
20 Id. at 145, 235 P. at 274.
21 29 Okla. Crim. 203, 233 P. 249 (1925).
22 Id. at 206-07, 233 P. at 250.
2 Smith v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 144, 148-49, 235 P. 273, 274
(1925).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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These distinctions seem somewhat remote and strained. It
should be noted that under the Oklahoma Statutes, in force
at that time,24 relating to the search of private residences in
the enforcement of the prohibition laws, a private residence,
occupied as such, could not be searched unless it was a place
of public resort. This was the reason for the allegation that
the residence, though private, was in fact used as a place of
public resort.
In the 1947 case of Hughes v. State25 the affidavit for a
search warrant read in part as follows:
Affiant further states that the above described premises
is a place of public resort where divers persons congre-
gate for the purpose of buying, selling, drinking, and
offering for sale intoxicating liquor and where intoxi-
cating liquors are manufactured, bartered, stored, and
given away, in violation of the prohibition laws of the
state of Oklahoma and constitute a public nuisance. 2= 6
The court determined that the affidavit in this case was
proper; yet the allegations "constitutes a public nuisance" and
"is a place of public resort" appear to be nothing more than
mere conclusions by the affiant. In fact, the court recognized
this in Jordan v. State.27 Apparently the additional qualifying
statement in the affidavit "that divers persons congregate for
the purpose of buying and selling,"28 removes the allegation
from the realm of mere conclusion. A bare allegation that a
place is a private residence and is in part a place of public
resort is insufficient where no statement of evidentiary facts
are set out upon which to base the conclusion. 29
24 Ch. 37, (1959) Okla. Laws 141, Repealing OKLA. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 88 (1951).
25 85 Okla. Crim. 25, 184 P.2d 625 (1947).
26 Id. at 29, 184 P.2d at 627.
27 327 P.2d 712 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
28 Id. at 718.
29 Hughes v. State, 85 Okla. Crim. 25, 184 P.2d 625 (1947).
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 5 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss2/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
In regard to the nature of facts required in an affidavit,
the court has said that:
The statements set forth in the affidavit must be of facts
and of the nature concerning things which would make
the same competent as evidence in the court as tending
to prove the same ultimate facts or conclusions.80
On the other hand this rule was ignored by the court in approv-
ing the following allegation in a search warrant affidavit:
[T~he described premises has a reputation in the com-
munity of being a place where liquor is stored in viola-
tion of the law. 1
Obviously the affiant would not be able to testify to such a
conclusion as a proper part of the prosecution's case in chief.
THE DEGREE OF PROOF
The degree of proof required to establish probable cause
in so far as evidentiary facts are concerned must be considered.
The court stated in Ray v. State32 that:
The function of the search warrant in seizure proceed-
ings is to aid the proper officers in procuring evidence to
be used by the State in prosecuting the defendant, which
evidence could not be secured without the aid of a search
warrant. Being a preliminary proceeding to the main
case, it is only necessary that the affidavit should show
probable cause as in a preliminary hearing . . . . the
same degree of proof should not be required in pro-
curing a search warrant as would be required in secur-
ing a conviction in a trial.33
It also has been declared by the court that:
While a search warrant must be based upon evidentiary
facts, the quantum of evidence necessary to show prob-
able cause may be quite insufficient to support a ver-
dict of guilty.84
3o Sikes v. State, 323 P.2d 376 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
81 Simpson v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 344, 236 P. 55 (1925).
82 43 Okla. Crim. 1, 276 P. 785 (1929).
ss Id. at 5, 276 P. at 786.
84 Pitzer v. State, 69 Okla. Crim. 363, 103 P.2d 109 (1940).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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It can be reasonably concluded at this point that the facts
alleged in the affidavit for search warrant in order to estab-
lish probable cause, (a) must be evidentiary in nature,
(b) cannot be bare conclusions, and (c) although evidentiary
in nature, need not meet the degree of proof necessary for
conviction.
These requirements are somewhat qualified because of
conflicting court decisions. Reason dictates that although there
may be some bare conclusions contained in an affidavit, the
presence of evidentiary matters upon which the magistrate
may determine probable cause should validate the instrument.
The mere presence of some hearsay should not of itself defeat
the affidavit. The question is not whether there are any facts
contained in the affidavit, but rather if there are sufficient
facts alleged to establish probable cause. It is certainly proper
under the law of Oklahoma to assert that the absence of any
evidentiary facts in the affidavit would defeat a finding of
probable cause. Yet it is impossible to state with any certainty
just how many or what type of evidentiary facts are neces-
sary to establish probable cause.
THE USE OF HEARSAY
The consideration of hearsay as a proper basis for deter-
mining probable cause is of great importance to law enforce-
ment. This is particularly true since it is generally recognized
that it is necessary to rely on and use information from so-
called unidentified informants. The law in Oklahoma on this
question, as in the other areas of search and seizure, is
confused.
The case of Southard v. State35 has been relied on as
authority for the rule that hearsay is not allowed to support
probable cause in Oklahoma. This 1956 case concerned the
crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and the
defendant argued in appealing his conviction that the affidavit
3 297 P.2d 585 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
8
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was insufficient to support a search warrant. The affidavit
stated in part:
That he (the affiant) has probable cause to believe and
affiant does believe that intoxicating liquor is being
manufactured, sold, etc., by Jack Southard on certain
premises described (the kind of intoxicating liquor is
not described or designated).
That said premises are not occupied as a residence (there
is then a contradictory allegation) That said premises
are occupied as a residence and a part or all of said resi-
dence is used as a store, shop, hotel, boarding house, or
place of storage, and said residence is a place of public
resort.
That the probable cause of affiants belief as above set
forth is based on the following facts which your affiant
personally knows to be true: That Jack Southard has
a reputation as being a person who deals in intoxicat-
ing liquors.
That said premises, is known as being a place where in-
toxicating liquors are bartered, sold, and otherwise dis-
posed of, and that affiant knows that intoxicating liquors
are stored on said premises.30 6
After examining the affidavit the court said that "[i]t would
appear affiant's knowledge was based strictly on hearsay."3 7
It went on to hold that an affidavit based upon hearsay and
"information and belief", and not in positive terms, is insuf-
ficient to support a search warrant.
Where statements in an affidavit for a search warrant are
made in positive terms, the court has often held that there
can be no inquiry behind the affidavit to show that the affiant
did not have sufficient knowledge of the statements alleged.38
There have been instances, however, where the Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that the affiant did not in fact
have personal knowledge of statements in an affidavit. These
opportunities arose because the prosecutor failed to object at
36 Id. at 590.
3 7 Id.38E.g., Addington v. State, 268 P.2d 912 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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the proper time in the trial court. Therefore evidence outside
the affidavit was taken for consideration on appeal8 9 By the
same token, there have been cases in which the court made
the same determination after examining only the affidavit.40
It would be only fair to state that in such instances the court,
right or wrong, had to deal in conjecture.
In the case of Baker v. State41 the court set out a suggested
affidavit which it said would have been proper in that case.
The proposed affidavit included the following allegations:
[T]hat one ....... ........... saw property of this
character being conveyed to the premises of Harry
Baker (defendant)
That Harry Baker had made statements to others indi-
cating that he had desired to take this property.42
These statements are clearly predicated on hearsay informa-
tion. The allegation that someone other than the affiant saw
the property transported to the defendant's house is informa-
tion from an informant and clearly hearsay. Furthermore,
the allegation that the defendant had made incriminating
remarks to a third party would, under the rules of evidence,
also constitute hearsay. Notwithstanding these obvious hear-
say allegations in the proposed affidavit the court considered
them proper and referred to them as "facts as a basis for
belief."43
The case of Jordan v. State,44 decided shortly aft e r
Southard v. State,45 is also of great interest at this point. A
portion of the affidavit in Jordan alleged "that the defendant
is known to be in the whiskey business".46
89 E.g., Lee v. State, 297 P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).40 E q., Yeargain v. State, 67 Okla. Crim. 262, 93 P.2d 1104 (1939).
41 28 Okla. Crim. 408, 231 P. 320 (1924).
42 Id. at 413, 231 P. at 322.
43 Id, 231 P. at 322.
44 327 P.2d 712 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958). See text accompanying
notes 27-28 supra.
4 297 P.2d 585 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956). See text accompanying
notes 35-37 supra.
10
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The court sustained the affidavit, but with the reserva-
tion that it should not be considered as a model. In addition,
language was used which shows the basis for the Southard
decision:
[w]hile the affidavit in question is by no means a model,
still it has been seen... that it contains positive allega-
tions of purported facts within the knowledge of affiant,
and is not based entirely on hearsay, as in the Southard
case.47
It appears, therefore, that the court explains Southard as pre-
dicated on and dictated by the fact that the entire affidavit
was based on hearsay.
Lee v. State48 is sometimes relied on for authority that
hearsay cannot be the subject matter of a search warrant affi-
davit in Oklahoma. In that case, for some unexplained reason,
the information was furnished by a chief of police while the
affidavit was sworn to by the sheriff of a different county.
It appears that the affidavit was in positive form, but the
prosecutor failed to make a timely objection at the trial court.
This failure to object permitted evidence to develop which
showed that the affidavit was not predicated on the personal
knowledge of the affiant. The court reversed the conviction
and said:
On the record thus made, it clearly appears that the
matters alleged and sworn to by the sheriff were
based not on his personal knowledge, but were pre-
dicated entirely upon information and belief... .49
It is interesting to note that this case was decided only seven
days prior to the Southard case. Yet here the word entirely
was used as it was later used in the Jordan case; reference
46 327 P.2d at 718.
47 Id. at 719.
48 297 P.2d 572 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
49 Id. at 573.
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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was made to the ruling in Southard.
In 1957 the court observed that:
[o]n the whole record as made herein the trial court
should have sustained the motion to suppress for the
reason the information in the affidavit was not pre-
dicated upon the personal knowledge of the affiant...
but was based entirely upon hearsay.0
Twenty years earlier it had stated that:
[t]he affiant should swear to facts showing probable
cause for his belief. That does not mean that the affi-
ant must know positively that a person is a thief, or has
liquor in his possession. To make an affidavit based upon
knowledge of guilt would in many instances be impos-
sible, but the affidavit should be based upon such facts
as the belief is founded.5 1
It can only be concluded that there is a distinction between
facts per se, that is, information within the personal know-
ledge of the affiant, and allegations which though not person-
ally known, are sufficient to justify a conclusion of prob-
able cause.
The court had an opportunity in 1942 to rule on an affi-
davit in which there was in addition to positive statements
of fact an allegation that the affiant "knows persons who have
bought whiskey there very recently".52 It was urged on
appeal that the failure to include the names of those who
allegedly bought the whiskey would make the affidavit
nothing more than an affidavit based on "information and
belief". It must be noted that the questioned allegation is
nothing more than hearsay, yet the court said:
We do not consider that it was necessary to allege the
names of the parties who had bought the whiskey....
The statements in an affidavit for the issuance of a
50 Hice v. State, 317 P.2d 294, 295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (em-
phasis added).51 Davis v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 306, 310, 86 P.2d 65, 67 (1938).
62 Young v. State 74 Okla. Crim. 64, 123 P.2d 294 (1942).
12
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search warrant need not be as specific as the allegations
in an information or indictment.P
Perhaps the explanation of the apparent conflict in decisions
is that the court considered the affidavit sufficient since it
was not dependent entirely on hearsay. In any event, it can-
not be said with certainty whether the law of this state
considers hearsay in the form of information from a re-
liable informant proper for a search warrant affidavit. Cer-
tain conclusions can be stated, however. Affidavits entirely
dependent on hearsay have always been ruled invalid in
Oklahoma. Affidavits predicated in part on hearsay but which
contain positive statements or evidentiary facts within the
knowledge of affiant have sometimes been held sufficient.
FELoNY v. MISDEmEANOR
The term "reasonable cause" has been used interchange-
ably with the term "probable cause" in Oklahoma."4 Oklahoma
law authorizes arrest for a felony and a subsequent search of
the individual arrested without a warrant if the arrest is based
on "reasonable cause".55 There is no question but that officers
properly effect arrests for felonies and conduct incidental
searches each day. The reasonable (probable) cause authoriz-
ing the arrest in such cases may be predicated on hearsay.58
Yet, that same information may not be sufficient to sustain an
affidavit for a valid sarch warrant. It is not logical to inter-
pret the law in such a way that it is easier to search without
a warrant than it is to obtain a valid search warrant. Such
an application of the law seems strange indeed in view of
the preference the court has expressed for the use of search
warrants:
The County Attorneys of this State, and no doubt many
of them have already done so, should bring before them
the sheriff and his deputies and also other peace officers
53 Id. at 68, 123 P.2d at 299.
54 Chronister v. State, 353 P.2d 493 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
r5 OKLA. STAT. tit 22, § 196 (3) (1961).
5 Davis v. State, 377 P.2d 226 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
13
Fallis: Searching for Probable Cause
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1968
1968J SEARCHING FOR PROBABLE CAUSE 151
of their county and explain to them in detail the neces-
sity of a search warrant.57
The court has often stated the historical reasoning and pur-
pose behind the requirements of search warrants to enter a
person's property. It would appear that they desire to en-
courage the use of warrants which can be accomplished only
by a reasonable application of the rule concerning probable
cause for affidavits.
There is another important factor in the Oklahoma deci-
sions. Every case discussed involves a misdemeanor, usually
a prohibition violation. Misdemeanor law, as distinguished
from felony law, grants an officer authority to arrest and
search without a warrant only if the offense is committed in
his presence. 58 The officer may not make a misdemeanor
arrest solely on the basis of reasonable (probable) cause or
informant's information. This more stringent requirement
might unconsciously have been applied by the court to con-
clude that he should not be able to obtain a search warrant
in misdemeanor cases on that type of evidence.
To restrict those engaged in law enforcement to arrest
or search based only on their personal knowledge, and pre-
clude the use of hearsay information, would make it impos-
sible for them to fulfill their responsibility. In the first
place, such a requirement would obviate the necessity for
search warrants. It would also require that a law enforce-
ment officer be lawfully present at the commission of every
crime or at the place where property, the subject of a search
warrant, was held. The United States Supreme Court has
pointed out these difficulties:
If an officer may act upon probable cause without a
warrant when the only incriminating evidence in his
possession is hearsay, it would be incongruous to hold
that such evidence presented in an affidavit is insuf-
6 Denton v. State, 62 Okla. Crim. 8, 15, 70 P.2d 135, 138 (1937).
58 Hill v. State, 298 P.2d 1066 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956).
14
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ficent basis for a warrant. If evidence of a more judici-
ally competent or persuasive character than would havejustified an officer in acting on his own without a war-
rant must be presented when a warrant is sought, war-
rants could seldom legitimatize police conduct, and re-
sort to them would ultimately be discouraged.P9
It is now the well settled federal rule that:
hearsay evidence may provide the probable cause
necessary for the issuance of a search warrant where
a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay evidence
is presented.60
It is important to examine the affidavit in the Jones case
to insure that it was in fact not based entirely on hearsay. In
effect it alleged that on a certain date the affiant received
information that the defendant was involved in illegal nar-
cotic traffic and kept a ready supply in the described apart-
ment. The affidavit went on to allege that informant told the
affiant that on many occasions he had purchased narcotic
drugs from the defendant at that location. It set out the date
of the last purchase by the informant. The affiant also swore
that the defendants are "familiar to the undersigned and
other members of the Narcotic Squad. Both have admitted
to the use fo narcotic drugs and display needle marks as evi-
dence of same." 61 The affidavit also stated that the same in-
formation had been received from additional sources. The
court held the affidavit sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause. The case is cited as expressly sanctioning the
use of hearsay evidence to secure a federal search warrant.
Subsequent federal decisions reiterate the Jones rule. One
qualification was stated in United States v. Ventresca:62
"EA]n affidavit may be based on hearsay information
9 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).60 Annot., 10 A.L.R. 3d 359, 364 (1965).
81 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 n.2 (1960) (emphasis
added).
62 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
[Vol. 5, No. 2
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and need not reflect the direct personal observations of
the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of
some of the underlying circumstances" supporting the
affiant's conclusions and his belief that any informant
involved "whose identity need not be disclosed... was
'credible' or his information 'reliable'."63
The majority of state decisions indicate that they are follow-
ing the lead of the federal rule. The acceptance of hearsay
in those states, however, is with the same qualification as the
federal rule: it is considered proper only where a substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay evidence is presented. Okla-
homa is counted among the minority of states on the basis of
Southard and Hice." However, in both of those instances the
affidavits were entirely hearsay, no basis for crediting the
hearsay was presented, and they were prior to the Jones
decision.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has not really
had the opportunity to rule on a factual situation which fits
within the federal rule. Although one cannot say with any
certainty that the court in Oklahoma would follow the fed-
eral rule, there is no authority to the contrary. The search
for probable cause therefore continues, only time will dis-
close what is ahead on the trip. Perhaps the court will adopt
the federal rule and help clear the fog emitting from deci-
sions rendered during the prohibition years in Oklahoma.
0 Id. at 108, citing Aguilar v. Texas 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
m Annot., supra note 60. See text accompanying notes 35-37, 50-
51 supra.
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